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I. INTRODUCTION
In October of 2015, the city of Glendale voted to end the
provision of subsidized health insurance to its seven hundred
retirees. The move saves the California city from having to report a
$240 million liability on its balance sheet, as would have been
required for the 2017-18 fiscal year under the new accounting rules
recently adopted by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board
(GASB). 2 The city had considered - and rejected - a similar measure
in 2009. The "game changer" this time around: the Affordable Care
* David and Pamela Donohue Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School.
1. Arin Mikailian, Glendale to Change Health Benefit for Retired City Workers, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2015, 6:55 PM), <http://www.latimes.com/socal/glendale-news-press/tn-gnp-glen
dale-to-ond-health-benclit-for-rctired-city-workers-20151007-story.html>.
2. Id.; see infra Part IV.
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Act (ACA or the Act).
Just as the city of Glendale was negotiating to eliminate retiree
health benefits, the state of California reached a collective bargaining
agreement with the Professional Engineers in California Government
(PECG) in which PECG members and the state would make
contributions to prefund retiree health care benefits for the first time.4
The agreement on a prefunding strategy signaled an important shift
away from the pay-as-you-go financing method that had been the
norm for retiree health care benefits for many decades.
Since the 1960s, public sector employers have routinely provided
health benefits to retired employees, even as such benefits have
gradually disappeared in the private sector. In 2014, 86 percent of
state government employees and 66 percent of local government
employees had access to employer-sponsored retiree healthcare prior
to turning sixty-five. 7 Eighty-four percent of state employees and 59
percent of local employees had access to retiree health benefits after
turning sixty-five.' Longer life expectancies and growing healthcare
costs, however, have made the provision of retiree health and other
non-pension benefits such as life and disability insurance (together,
"other post-employment benefits" or OPEBs) a costly undertaking
for public employers.9 As of 2014, estimates of the total unfunded
accrued liability of state and local governments for OPEBs exceeded
$1 trillion."
Today, the future of such employer-sponsored benefits is more
uncertain than ever as state and local governments respond to the
implementation of the Affordable Care Act and the adoption of new
GASB accounting standards for OPEB liabilities, all in the shadow of
3. Mikailian, supra note 1.
4. Kyle Glazier, California Cites OPEB Progress in Labor Deal, THE BOND BUYER
(Sept. 10, 2015, 12:48 PM ET), <http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/california-cites-
opeb-progress-in-labor-deal-1084272-1.html>.
5. SeeinfraPartll.
6. ROBERT L. CLARK & MELINDA SANDLER MORRILL, RETIREE HEALTH PLANS IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR: IS THERE A FUNDING CRISIs? 5-6 (2010).
7. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, NAT'L COMPENSATION
SURVEY, TABLE 42, HEALTH-RELATED BENEFITS: ACCESS STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
WORKERS (2014), available at <http://www.bls.gov/ncs/cbs/benefits/2014/ownership/govt/tab
le42a.pdf>.
8. Id.
9. Although health insurance is the most common OPEB, other benefits in the OPEB
category include dental, vision, and prescription benefits, as well as life insurance, disability
insurance, long-term care insurance, and other benefits.
10. Byron Lutza & Louise Sheiner, The Fiscal Stress Arising from State and Local Retiree
Health Obligations, 38 J. HEALTH ECON. 130, 130 (2014).
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the evolving case law on retiree health plan amendments. Although
the Affordable Care Act does little to address employer-sponsored
retiree health benefits directly, it creates a critical alternative to
employer-sponsored health benefits. For retirees not yet eligible for
Medicare, the ACA, as interpreted by King v. Burwell, ensures access
to health insurance outside employer-sponsored plans." For public
employers, in turn, the ACA presents an opportunity to limit or
eliminate retiree health benefits without depriving former employees
of access to health insurance, a move that some have estimated could
12save state and local governments up to $21 billion over ten years.
Expanded access to individual insurance coverage comes at a
time when the newly adopted GASB rules aim to bring to light - and
to the attention of taxpayers and credit rating agencies - the
employer liabilities associated with the promised benefits. Although
the accounting rules in no way change the actual cost of the benefits
nor impose any funding requirements, they are likely to motivate
some public employers to modify or terminate the benefits provided
to retirees. Legal constraints on such modifications vary tremen-
dously across states, but recent Supreme Court guidance in M & G
Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett may facilitate the amendment of
retiree health benefits determined by collective bargaining
agreements."
The new GASB rules are also likely to encourage state and local
governments - either as an alternative to or in conjunction with
benefit changes - to alter the funding of OPEBs. While traditionally
OPEBs have been funded on a pay-as-you-go-basis, the GASB rules
adopted in 2004 and 2015 provide strong incentives for state and local
governments to establish trusts and set aside assets for accrued
benefits. Plans with dedicated assets for OPEBs can invest those
assets and use the returns to help offset OPEB costs. Under the
GASB rules, such plans are permitted to use higher discount rates to
calculate the present value of the accrued liabilities and, in turn, of
the contributions required to achieve full funding. The response by
public plan sponsors has been quite striking. Over the last decade,
some thirty-two states have set up OPEB trusts.1 4 Although the assets
11. 135S.Ct.2480(2015).
12. Jeremy D. Goldhaber-Fiebert et al., Will Divestment from Employment-Based Health
Insurance Save Employers Money? The Case of State and Local Governments, 12 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 343 (2015).
13. See 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015); infra Part V.
14. SUSSAN S. CORSON, STANDARD & POOR'S RATING SERVICES, DIVERGING TRENDS
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in such trusts currently represent a small fraction of the total accrued
liabilities, the trend toward prefunding may nevertheless reshape how
employers and employees view retiree health commitments and how
such commitments are treated under the law.
This article reviews the changes in public sector retiree health
benefits since the enactment of the ACA and examines the important
choices and competing incentives presently facing public employers.
Part II describes retiree health benefits in the public sector prior to
the passage of the ACA, with a particular focus on the variation
across state-administered plans and the challenges facing such plans.
Part III surveys the ACA provisions that directly impact retiree
health plans, as well as those that may indirectly reshape the
provision of health benefits for public sector retirees. Part IV presents
the new accounting rules adopted by GASB in 2015 and analyzes
their impact on public sector retiree health plans. Part V describes the
evolving legal landscape for plan modification and the ways in which
new funding strategies may impact the legal status of retiree health
benefits. Part VI assesses the options available to public employers in
light of the incentives presented by the ACA, the new GASB rules,
and the recent case law developments. It also reviews the trends in
public sector benefits to date. Finally, Part VII concludes.
II. PUBLIC SECTOR RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS BEFORE THE ACA
To attract and retain employees, public sector employers have
traditionally offered relatively generous pension and retiree health
benefits. The health benefits have included access to employer-
sponsored health insurance both for retirees not yet eligible for
Medicare (the so-called "early retirees") and retirees ages sixty-five
and older (the so-called "Medicare-eligible" retirees). Although a
valuable benefit for both groups, prior to the passage of the ACA,
access to employer-sponsored plans was a benefit that saved many
early retirees from the "financial disaster" of having to obtain
individual insurance coverage. 5 Pre-existing medical conditions and
other underwriting criteria had made obtaining quality individual
health insurance "forbiddingly expensive, if not completely
impossible" for early retirees."
UNDERLIE STABLE OVERALL U.S. OPEB LIABILITY 5 (2014).
15. Richard L. Kaplan et al., Retirees at Risk: The Precarious Promise of Post-Employment
Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y. L. & ETHICS 287, 291 (2009).
16. Id.
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The quality and cost of health insurance sponsored by public
employers, however, have varied widely across plans. In the absence
of overarching federal regulation, heterogeneity in state law and in
collective bargaining dynamics has produced hundreds of public
sector retiree health plans that differ in the eligibility criteria to
qualify for the benefits, the generosity of the plan terms, and the
proportion of the premiums covered by the employer." The variation
has also extended to the organization and governance of retiree
health plans. Among plans administered at the state level, for
example, some cover only state employees, while others cover both
state and local government employees." Some plans are administered
by state retirement systems, while others are administered by
departments of administration or similar state agencies." In some
cases, entirely new "systems" have been created to manage retiree
health benefits.20 Plans that cover the employees of more than one
employer vary in the allocation of assets and liabilities: the so-called
''agent" plans maintain individual accounts to track each employer's
assets and liabilities (even if assets are pooled for investment
17. CLARK & MORRILL, supra note 6, at 26-83; Michael Nadol et al., Managing Public-
Sector Retiree Health-Care Benefits Under the Affordable Care Act, GOV'T FIN. REV., Apr. 2014,
at 11, 11-13.
18. In Alabama, for example, the State Employees' Health Insurance Plan (SEHIP)
covers only state government employees and retirees, while the Public Education Employees'
Health Insurance Fund is a health insurance plan for active and retired employees of state and
local educational institutions. In 2007, Constitutional Amendment 798 created irrevocable trusts
for both plans. STATE OF ALA., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2014, at 118-27 (2014) [hereinafter AL 2014 CAFR],
available at <http://comptroller.alabama.gov/pdfs/CAFR/cafr.2014.Alabama.pdf>.
19. For example, the California Public Employces Retirement System administers the
California Employers' Retiree Benefit Trust Fund for state employees and employees of
participating local employers. CAL. PUB. EMPS. RET. SYS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL
FINANCIAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2014, at 45 (2014) 1hereinafter
CalPERS 2014 CAFR], available at <https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/cafr-
2014.pdf>. In Indiana, the State Personnel Department administers the State Personnel Plan for
retired state employees. STATE OF IND., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2014, at 112 (2014), available at <http://www.in.gov/audit
or/files/Entirc_2014_CAFR.pdf>.
20. For example, the State Employees' Insurance Board (SEIB) is a state agency
established by the Alabama Legislature to administer the State Employees' Health Insurance
Plan (SEHIP). The SEIB members include the five members of the State Personnel Board, the
Director of Finance, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Employees' Retirement System of
Alabama, two clocted active employces of the state, and two clocted retirees covered under the
SEHIP. See ALA. STATE EMPs. INS. BD., THE STATE EMPLOYEES' HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN,
FAOs, <http://www.alscib.org/PDF/SEHIP/FAO/SEHIPFAO-AboutSEHIPPlan.pdf> (last
visited Apr. 8, 2016). The state of Rhode Island set up a separate OPEB system in 2010. 36 R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 36-12.1-5 (2015) ("An OPEB System is hercby established and placed under the
management of the OPEB Board for the purpose of providing and administering OPEB
Bencfits for Retired Employees of the State of Rhode Island and their dependents.").
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purposes) while "cost-sharing" plans pool the assets and liabilities of
all the participating employers.21
Despite the differences in design and administration, public
sector retiree health plans share certain practices and challenges with
respect to plan funding. In stark contrast to pension benefits, retiree
health benefits have been - and many still are - funded on a pay-as-
you-go basis. Under the pay-as-you-go approach, public employers
contribute each year only the amount equal to the benefits distributed
or claimed in that year. No money is set aside to prefund the accrued
liabilities, even if state statutory and constitutional provisions include
nonimpairment provisions for retiree health benefits. The practice
reflects the norm in the private sector, where the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) explicitly provides
for the vesting and funding of "pension" but not "welfare" benefits. 2 2
Barring contrary provisions in collective bargaining agreements,
private sector employers may eliminate retiree health benefits at any
*23time.
In the public sector, the pay-as-you-go model has come under
scrutiny since GASB adopted the first set of significant accounting
changes in 2004.24 The accounting standards in GASB Statement 45
(GASB 45) extended GASB's previously adopted standards for
pension plans to state and local government OPEB plans. GASB 45
required public employers to disclose, for the first time, the value of
the benefits already earned and those expected to be earned by
employees in the future, the value of any assets set aside to cover such
benefits, and the difference between the two categories.2 5 It also
required public employers to calculate the "annual required
21. For example, the California Employers' Retirce Benefit Trust Fund is an agent
multiple-employer plan with 427 employers. See CaIPERS 2014 CAFR, supra note 19, at 31.
Meanwhile the Alabama Retired Education Employces' Health Care Trust is a multiple
employer cost-sharing defined benefit health care plan with 197 participating employers. See AL
2014 CAFR, supra note 18, at 127.
22. See Employce Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 1051
(2012); ERISA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 1081; see also M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S.
Ct. 926, 933 (2015) ("Although ERISA imposes claborate minimum funding and vesting
standards for pension plans . . . it explicitly exempts welfare benefits plans from those rules.")
(internal citations omitted).
23. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. at 933 ("Employers or other plan sponsors are generally free under
ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.").
24. GoVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENTAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 45: ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING BY
EMPLOYERS FOR POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS (2004) [hereinafter
GASB 45].
25. Id. at Summary.
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contribution" (ARC) - defined as the amount a public employer
would have to contribute annually to cover the cost of benefits
accrued in that year and to pay off any accrued unfunded liabilities in
no more than thirty years - and to disclose the percentage of the
ARC contributed in the reporting year. 26 Although as Part V
describes, GASB 45 left public employers with tremendous discretion
to select actuarial methods and allowed employers in cost-sharing
plans to obfuscate individual employer liabilities, the rules
nevertheless brought to light the value of unfunded OPEB promises
and the growing percentage of state and local government budgets
that would have to be spent to cover retiree health benefits.
The disclosure requirements went into effect just as the 2008
financial crisis began to strain the budgets of state and local
governments.27 The initial disclosures revealed great disparities in the
absolute and relative amounts of unfunded OPEB liabilities across
states, with most public employers paying for the benefits of retired
workers from current revenue.28 For example, as of 2007-08, unfunded
state liabilities ranged from $71 million for Arizona to $11 billion for
Massachusetts and $62 billion for California.29 On the whole, the new
GASB requirements - along with rising healthcare costs, mounting
unfunded pension liabilities, and declining state revenues - began to
increase the pressure on public employers to find ways to control
OPEB costs. It was at this time that Congress enacted the ACA.
III. ACA PROVISIONS FOR RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS
The ACA does little to regulate employer-sponsored retiree
health benefits directly and even shields retiree-only plans from the
Act's most significant reforms. Nevertheless, by expanding individual
access to health insurance, enhancing certain Medicare benefits, and
subjecting public sector plans to the Cadillac tax, the ACA
dramatically alters the costs and benefits of employer-sponsored
retiree healthcare. This Part describes the provisions of the ACA that
26. Id.
27. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RETIREE
HEALTH BENEFITs 21 (2009), available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1061.pdf>
1hereinafter GAO REPORTI ("Unfunded OPEB liabilities on their own are large enough to
represent a fiscal pressure for state and local governments but are also likely to be considered
part of the broader fiscal challenge of managing increasing health care costs. State and local
governments faced increasing fiscal pressures in 2008, in part because of recession-induced
revenue shortfalls.").
28. Id. at 9-10.
29. Id. at 36-37.
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affect retiree health benefits and builds on the insights and evidence
from the six years since the law's passage to assess their impact.
The Act's sole provision to address employer-sponsored retiree
benefits directly is the Early Retiree Reinsurance Program (ERRP).3 0
Designed to encourage employers to maintain retiree health benefits
for retirees over the age of fifty-five but not yet eligible for Medicare,
the ERRP provided a temporary subsidy for private and public
employers that offered health benefits to early retirees through 2014,
when such retirees could access health insurance through the public
exchanges.
For eligible employers, and while the funds lasted, the
Department of Health and Human Services offered to reimburse 80
percent of claims costs for health benefits between $15,000 and
$90,000. The program proved popular with both public and private
employers. Demand for the subsidies quickly outpaced the available
$5 billion in funding and the program ceased accepting applications in
May of 2011.32
Beyond providing a temporary subsidy, the ACA imposes few
new requirements on employer-sponsored health plans for retirees. In
fact, the ACA leaves in place a critical exemption for retiree-only
plans. Pursuant to section 732(a)(1) of ERISA, group health plans
with "less than two participants who are current employees" on the
first day of a given plan year are exempt from all of the group health
plan requirements of ERISA.3  To the extent that the ACA's
substantive requirements have been incorporated by reference into
ERISA, retiree-only plans are exempt from the ACA's mandated
insurance market reforms.34 Therefore, requirements such as the
extension of medical plan eligibility for adult children and the ban on
30. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 42 U.S.C.).
31. Id. § 1102, 124 Stat. at 143 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 18002 (2012)).
32. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT, ENROLLMENT AND SPENDING IN THE EARLY RETIREE REINSURANCE AND PRE-
EXISTING CONDITION INSURANCE PLAN PROGRAMS 9 (2013), available at <http://www.
gao.gov/assets/660/654260.pdf>.
33. The exception is the standards relating to benefits for mothers and newborns under
ERISA section 711, 29 U.S.C. § 1191a(a) (2012).
34. This interpretation was challenged in King v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois,
currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. In this case, the spouse of a participant in a retiree-only
plan challenged a plan amendment that set a $500,000 lifetime benefit maximum. The district
court held that, pursuant to ERISA section 732(a), the ACA's lifetime coverage limit ban did
not apply to retiree-only plans. King v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ill., 104 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (S.D.
Cal. 2015), docketed, Case No. 15-55880 (9th Cir. June 9, 2015).
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annual dollar limits for essential health benefits do not apply to
private sector retiree-only plans. Agency guidance extends the same
treatment to retiree-only plans sponsored by public sector
emplovers."
Although the ACA allows retiree-only plans to escape much of
its substantive bite, the ACA's establishment and regulation of
health-insurance exchanges, together with its reforms to Medicare,
make employer-sponsored retiree health insurance a less essential
benefit." Whereas retirees not yet eligible for Medicare once faced
extremely limited and prohibitively expensive alternatives to
employer-sponsored health insurance, the ACA's creation of public
health insurance exchanges in every state, and the corresponding
guaranteed availability and renewal rules, prohibitions on exclusions
and discrimination on the basis of health status, and controlled rate
setting aim to ensure access to health insurance outside the employer
context.7 The ACA's provision of premium tax credits to eligible
individuals who purchase insurance on an exchange - as upheld by
King v. Burwell - means that for a subset of early retirees, health
insurance obtained through the exchanges may be less costly than the
insurance available through employer-sponsored plans.38
For Medicare-eligible retirees, the ACA makes a number of
changes to Medicare that impact the value of any supplemental
benefits or subsidies offered through employer-sponsored retiree
health plans. Most notably, the ACA aims to close Medicare Part D's
so-called "donut hole," which has required Medicare beneficiaries to
cover 100 percent of drug costs after reaching a specified threshold
35. Although ERISA section 732(a)(1) does not apply to state and local government plans,
in the preamble to the Interim Final Rules, the Departments of Labor, Treasury, and Health
and Human Services indicated that they will treat such plans like private sector plans for
purposes of the retiree-only exemption. See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and
Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,538, 34,538-40 (June 17, 2010)
(indicating that the Department of Health and Human Services does not intend to use its
resources to enforce the requirements of HIPAA or the Affordable Care Act with respect to
nonfederal governmental retiree-only plans).
36. Susan E. Cancelosi, The Bell Is Tolling: Retiree Health Benefits Post-Health Reform, 19
ELDER L.J. 49, 109-10 (2011).
37. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1311 (b)-(d), 124
Stat. 119, 173-78 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031(b)-(d) (2012)).
38. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); see also Goldhaber-Fiebert et al., supra note 12, at 353
(observing that 33 percent of state and local government retirees had incomes in the 138-400
percent of the Federal Poverty Line range, which would make them eligible for subsidies and/or
cost sharing on the health insurance exchanges); Nadol et al., supra note 17, at 14 (discussing the
report of the Retiree Health Benefits Commission in Chicago, which found that 58 percent of
annuitants in the Chicago city plan in 2014 would pay less through the state's exchange).
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and before becoming eligible for catastrophic coverage. Historically,
the gap in prescription drug coverage made employer-sponsored drug
coverage relatively more appealing. The ACA also provides that
Medicare-eligible retirees will have enhanced coverage of preventive
care services under Medicare, although this and other benefit
enhancements must be considered alongside the ACA provisions -
including changes to Part D premiums and Medicare Advantage plan
payments - that may increase the individual costs of Medicare
40coverage.
For both early and Medicare-eligible retirees, the ACA's
"Cadillac plan" excise tax - which does apply to retiree-only plans - is
expected to increase the cost of public sector OPEB plans. 4' The 40
percent excise tax, originally set to go into effect in 2018 but delayed
for two years in 2015, is to be imposed on the cost of employer-
sponsored coverage that exceeds certain statutory thresholds.4 2
Although the thresholds are slightly higher for employer-sponsored
plans that cover retirees, state and local government estimates suggest
that the tax is expected to impose significant costs on public sector
employers. 43 The anticipation of such significant costs united public
sector unions with the employer community and health insurance
companies in 2015 to lobby for the delay of the Cadillac tax.44
In sum, the ACA alters the traditional cost-benefit analysis for
public sector OPEB plans. The availability of individual coverage
through the exchanges (and the yet-to-be implemented Cadillac tax)
creates incentives for public employers to shift early retirees onto the
exchanges. While the ACA restricts the ability of employers to
39. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029,
1036-40 (2010) (amending42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-102, 1395w-152 (2012)).
40. Cancelosi, supra note 36, at 116.
41. See generally I.R.C. § 49801(c) (2012) (setting applicable dollar limits).
42. Id.
43. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, for example, estimated that the excise tax
results in a 1.37 percent and 3.73 percent increase to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts's
Actuarial Accrued Liability and Normal Cost, respectively. See AON HEWITT,
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT OTHER THAN PENSIONS
ACTUARIAL VALUATION FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2015, at 6 (2015), available at <http://
www. mass.gov/osc/docs/reports-audits/opcb/201 5-mass-gasb-45-report.pdf>. See generally Kate
Taylor, Health Care Law Raises Pressure on Public Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2013), <http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/05/nyregion/health-care-law-raises-pressure-on-public-employces-un
ions.html> (noting that the Cadillac tax could cost New York City $22 million in 2018,
increasing to $549 million in 2022).
44. See, e.g., Kristen Ricaurto Kncebl, Two-Year Delay of Cadillac Tax Included in
Spending Bill, BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 17, 2015), <http://www.bna.com/twoyear-delay-cadillac-
n57982065306/> (describing the "Alliance to Fight the 40" that fought to delay the Cadillac tax).
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"offload" active employees in this manner, the unique exemption
available to retiree-only plans affords state and local governments
greater flexibility to respond to the changes wrought by the ACA. In
particular, through retiree-only health reimbursement arrangements
(HRAs), public employers may cover, in full or in part, the cost of
marketplace coverage for pre-Medicare retirees.45 Although access to
funds through such HRAs would preclude retirees from receiving
premium tax credits, employers can permit retirees to choose on a
prospective basis whether they would be better off using the HRA
funds or maintaining eligibility for the federal tax credits.46
IV. THE NEW ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UNDER GASB 75
For public sector employers, the changes brought about by the
historic ACA legislation have coincided with important, albeit less
well known changes to the accounting rules governing state and local
government OPEB plans. A year after the ACA's public exchanges
became operational in 2014, GASB once again sought to bring
accounting standards for OPEBs in line with its revised standards for
pension benefits. 47 The changes adopted in 2015 - despite opposition
48from some public employers - impose a series of significant new
45. LESLEY LADERMAN & RICHARD STOVER, XEROX CORPORATION AND BUCK
CONSULTANTS, RETIREE HRAS AND THE ACA - DOING IT RIGHT (2015), <https://hrlaws.
services.xerox.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/08/hrc fyiIn-depth-2015-08-24.pdf>.
46. Id. In many cases, the value of the premium tax credits may exceed the value of the
amounts available through the HRA. Employers, therefore, should provide a retiree with the
opportunity to waive HRA coverage for any year in which he or she will be cligible for a
premium tax credit.
47. GoVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENTS OF GoVERNMENTAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 75: ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR
POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS (2015) 1hereinafter GASB 751. The
changes to pension benefits were adopted in 2012. See GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 67:
FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR PENSION PLANS (2012); GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., STATEMENTS OF GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 68:
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR PENSIONS (2012).
48. See generally Online Comment Letters, Project 34-IE, Accounting and Financial
Reporting for Postemployment Benefits Other than Pensions, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., <http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/CommentLetterC/GASBCommentLetter
Pagc&cid=1176157116776&project id=34-1E> (last visited Apr. 11, 2016). The Ohio Public
Employees Retirement System, for example, opposed the balance sheet disclosure of OPEB
liabilitics, claiming that "OPERS' health care plan is not contractually required or socially
obligated and the Board actions to modify the plan demonstrate that lack of obligation." Letter
from Karon Carraher, CPA Exec. Dir., OPERS, to Dir. of Research & Tech. Activitics,
Governmental Accounting Standards Bd. (Aug. 22, 2014). The International Association of
Firefighters disputed the application of pension accounting rules to OPEBs, since the latter "do
not receive the same legal protections as pensions, and are frequently subject to modification or
even termination." Letter from Harold A. Schaitbcrger, Gen. President, Int'l Ass'n of Fire
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standardization and disclosure requirements on state and local
governments that sponsor OPEB plans. Like the ACA, GASB 75
changes the cost-benefit analysis for OPEB plan sponsors. Although a
complete review of GASB 75 is beyond the scope of this article, the
following three changes represent the most significant and
consequential departures from the status quo.
First and foremost, under GASB 75, state and local governments
will be required - for the first time - to include unfunded OPEB
liabilities on their balance sheets. Previously, the total unfunded
liabilities were disclosed in supplementary materials, while only the
annual OPEB cost was included in the balance sheet. 49 GASB 75 also
imposes a uniform actuarial methodology on the calculation of OPEB
liabilities. The standardization of methodology is a significant
departure from prior GASB guidance and an important step in
facilitating the comparison of OPEB liabilities across plans. In the
absence of such standardization, plan sponsors have differed
dramatically in the actuarial methods and discount rate assumptions
used to calculate OPEB liabilities.o Once GASB 75 is in effect, all
plan sponsors will be required to use the entry-age cost method to
calculate the actuarial present value of projected benefit payments. In
addition, plan sponsors will be able to use the long-term expected rate
of return on investments as the discount rate only to the extent that
the plan's available assets and expected future contributions are
projected to be sufficient to make benefit payments. Beyond that
point, the discount rate will have to reflect the yield on a tax-exempt,
high-quality municipal bond. Under this approach, the more assets a
plan sponsor sets aside for the plan, the higher its permissible
discount rate will be. Plans relying solely on pay-as-you-go funding
will have to discount liabilities using the relatively low municipal
bond rate.
Finally, GASB 75 addresses the obfuscation of liabilities
Fighters, to Dir. of Research & Tech. Activities, Governmental Accounting Standards Bd.
(Aug. 26, 2014). St. Mary's Community Public Library, a small public employer, challenged
GASB's new requirements for cost-sharing plans, suggesting that the liability allocation method
under GASB 75 would be misleading, and would also undermine fiscal planning and the
employer's bond rating. The latter effect would "significantly impact Ithe employer's] operating
expenses." Letter from Susan Heckler Pittman, Dir., St. Mary's Cmty. Pub. Library, to Dir. of
Research & Tech. Activities, Governmental Accounting Standards Bd. (Aug. 28, 2014).
49. GASB 45, supra note 24, at Summary.
50. GAO REPORT, supra note 27, at 6-7 (noting that "differences in the actuarial cost
methods and assumptions used can result in significant differences in OPEB liability estimates,
which can make it challenging to compare estimates across governments").
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previously permitted under the "cost-sharing" arrangements
described in Part II. Under GASB 45, employers participating in
either single-employer or agent plans have been required to disclose
the ratio of assets to liabilities attributable to each employer, but
employers in cost-sharing plans have been required only to disclose
the aggregate funding levels of the plans. As a result, a significant
proportion of public employers - particularly municipalities - have
not had to calculate or disclose their unfunded OPEB liabilities. As
has been the case with pension obligations for employers in such cost-
sharing plans, the new GASB requirements for cost-sharing plans are
expected to dramatically increase the reported unfunded liabilities of
*51participating municipalities.
Although the GASB 75 standards in no way impose any funding
requirements on plan sponsors, nor do they change the underlying
reality in any way, the new reporting requirements will make retiree
health costs much more prominent, which in turn should subject such
costs to closer scrutiny from legislators, credit-ratings agencies,
taxpayers, and plan participants. For public employers with relatively
high unfunded liabilities, the GASB rules - and specifically the
potential downgrades in credit ratings and the corresponding
increases in borrowing costs - provide a powerful incentive to reduce
the present value of accrued unfunded liabilities.52 Public employers
can achieve this result by decreasing the benefits provided,
prefunding OPEB liabilities, or through a combination of both
strategies. Part V below turns to the legal framework for making any
such changes to public sector OPEBs.
V. THE MODIFICATION OF RETIREE HEALTH PLANS POST M &G
POLYMERS USA, LLC V. TACKETT
Public sector retiree health plans vary not just in the eligibility
and coverage terms, but also in the legal protection afforded to the
benefits. A public employer's ability to modify benefits for employees
51. ALICIA H. MUNNELL & JEAN-PIERRE AUBRY, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT
BOSTON COLL., STATE & LOCAL PENSION PLANS No. 47, GASB 68: How WILL STATE
UNFUNDED PENSION LIABILITIES AFFECT BIG CITIES (2016), available at <http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/SLP_47.pdf>.
52. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, DiNapoli Proposes
Option to Help State & Local Governments Pay for Retirce Health Care (Apr. 13, 2015),
available at <http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/aprl5/041315.htm> (arguing that "New
York is behind the eight ball on this issuc" and proposing legislation to "cstablish the legal
structure for creating trusts that the state and local governments could use to start saving the
funds needed to pay for these [OPEB] benefits").
2016] 159
160 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 20:147
or retirees depends on the highly idiosyncratic combination of
applicable statutory provisions, collective bargaining terms, and case
law in a particular jurisdiction.53 For example, in 2015, an appellate
court in California held that after the memorandum of understanding
between the city of South Pasadena and its police union expired, the
city was entitled to unilaterally reduce its medical insurance
contribution for retirees. Two years prior, however, a California
superior court held that a Los Angeles city ordinance freezing the
retiree health premium subsidy or requiring current employees to
contribute additional amounts constituted an impairment of a vested
right." Such variation reflects the lack of a coherent legal theory of
what retiree health benefits are, and how public employer "promises"
to provide such benefits should be treated. This Part first reviews the
legal framework - patchwork as it may be - for retiree health plan
modification. It then assesses the impact of the recent Supreme Court
guidance in M & G Polymers v. Tackett, a case that some suggest
should liberalize the modification of retiree health benefits." Lastly,
this Part also considers how the prefunding of retiree health benefits
encouraged by GASB and embraced by some public employers could
impact the benefits' status under the law.
At the heart of the challenge with adjudicating changes to retiree
health benefits is the question of whether retiree health benefits have
vested for particular groups of participants. In the private sector, the
traditional analysis under ERISA classifies retiree health plans as
"welfare benefit plans.",57 Pursuant to this categorization, such plans
are explicitly excluded from the vesting and funding requirements
that ERISA imposes on plans that provide "retirement income" to
53. See, e.g., John R. Dorocak & James Estes, State and Local Government Funding of
Health and Retirement Benefits for Employees: Current Problems and Possible Solutions with
California Health Benefits as an Example, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 303, 304 (2012); John Sanchez,
The Vesting, Modification, and Financing of Public Retiree Health Benefits in Light of New
Accounting Rules, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1147, 1149 (2008); Jenna Amato Moran, Comment,
The OPEB Tsunami: Riding the Wave of Public Sector Postemployment Health Benefits, 58
BUFF. L. REV. 677, 677 (2010).
54. S. Pasadena Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of S. Pasadena, No. B254176, 2015 WL
1094691 (Cal. App. Mar. 9,2015).
55. L.A. City Attorney's Ass'n v. City of L.A., No. BS135294 (Super. Ct. Cnty. L.A. Sept.
13, 2013), available at <http://www.lacaa.org/docs/1 3-09-13-order-granting-writ.pdf>.
56. Robert C. Pozen & Ronald J. Gilson, Debt-Saddled Municipal Budgets Get a Lifeline,
WALL ST. J, Mar. 1, 2015, at A13; Robert Pozen, Renegotiating Retiree Health Care Plans After
New Supreme Court Guidance, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (May 7, 2015), <http://healthaffairs.org
/blog/2015/05/07/renegotiating-rctirec-health-care-plans-after-new-supreme-court-guidance/>.
57. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012).
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retirees." Absent statutorily mandated vesting requirements, any
vesting must be provided by contract, typically through a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA). In many cases, however, such CBAs
are ambiguous - at times intentionally so - as to the duration of the
retiree health benefits set forth in the agreement."
Such ambiguity has generated extensive litigation.o In 2015, the
Supreme Court stepped in to resolve a circuit split as to the
presumptions used to resolve ambiguous CBA terms. In
M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, the employer had entered into
a collective bargaining agreement that promised that union
employees who reached a certain age and years of service would
receive a full company contribution for healthcare benefits at
retirement." Such benefits were to be provided for the duration of the
agreement, which was itself subject to renegotiation after three years.
After the agreement expired, the employer announced that retirees
had to begin contributing toward the cost of their health insurance.
The retirees sued, alleging that they had a vested right to lifetime
contribution-free healthcare benefits.62
In a unanimous decision, the justices held that "when a contract
is silent as to the duration of retiree benefits, a court may not infer
that the parties intended those benefits to vest for life."" Instead, the
Court suggested the ordinary contract law principles would apply,
including the principle that contractual obligations generally cease
upon the termination of the bargaining agreement.64 In a concurrence,
Justice Ginsburg noted that clear and express language is not
required to show that parties intended health benefits to vest; instead,
both explicit and implied terms of an agreement could evidence such
intent.5 In cases where a contract was found to be ambiguous, the
court could consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intentions of
58. ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2); David A. Pratt, The Past, Present and Future of
Retiree Health Benefits, 3 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 103, 113 (2007) (suggesting that "a plan that
provides health benefits across a worker's retirement period functions as a type of pension plan,
a pension plan that pays in specic rather than in dollars").
59. Maria O'Brien Hylton, After Tackett: Incomplete Contracts for Post-Employment
Healthcare (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 15-
30 Aug. 4, 2015), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2639607>.
60. Id. at 4.
61. 135 S. Ct. 926, 931 (2015).
62. Id. at 931-32.
63. Id. at 937.
64. Id. at 933, 935-36.
65. Id. at 937-38 (Ginsburg, J, concurring).
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the parties." The Court's elimination of the presumption in favor of
vesting - long-espoused by the Sixth Circuit - favored employers
seeking to amend benefits.7 Legislative efforts to mandate a
presumption in favor of vesting absent clear and convincing language
to the contrary were not successful.1
The Court's decision in Tackett has been called a "lifeline" for
public employers struggling with unfunded OPEB obligations."
Under the "lifeline" theory, public employees would now have to
show with affirmative evidentiary support that the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement extend the retiree health obligations
of state and local governments beyond the duration of a CBA. State
courts commonly look to private sector precedent in employee-
benefit matters and indeed, in the months since the decision was
handed down, Tackett already has been cited in several cases
concerning public sector benefits." Nevertheless, the jump from
Tackett to public sector plans may not be so simple. After all, Tackett
considers private sector plans subject to ERISA, the National Labor
Relations Act, and the Labor Management Relations Act, none of
which apply to public sector plans.7 ' Furthermore, in the public sector,
the terms of collective bargaining agreements must be considered
alongside any relevant state and local government law, including
constitutional and statutory provisions that protect OPEBs against
curtailment72 as well as ones that preserve employer flexibility to
66. Id. at 938.
67. See, e.g., Gilbert Brosky, Ding-Dong, Yard-Man Is Dead! Supreme Court Decision in
Tackett a Huge Win for Employers in the Retiree Healthcare Arena, EMP'T CLAss ACTION BLOG
(Jan. 28, 2015), <http://www.employmentclassactionreport.com/benefits/ding-dong-yard-man-is-
dead-supreme-court-decision-in-tackett-a-huge-win-for-employers-in-the-rctirec-healthcare-are
na/>.
68. Bankruptcy Fairness and Employee Benefits Protection Act, S. 2418, 113th Cong.
(2014).
69. Pozen & Gilson, supra note 56.
70. S. Pasadena Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of S. Pasadena, No. B254176, 2015 WL
1094691 (Cal. App. Mar. 9, 2015) (citing Tackett for the proposition that "when a contract is
silent as to the duration of retirce benefits, a court may not infer that the parties intended those
benefits to vest for life"); Harper Woods Retirees Ass'n v. City of Harper Woods, No. 318450,
2015 WL 5737812 (Mich. App. Oct. 1, 2015) (concluding that "that the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Tackett is consistent with Michigan's contract jurisprudence regarding CBAs, which
applics with equal force in both the public and private sectors in this regard"); Pontiac Police &
Fire Retiree Prefunded Group Health & Ins. Tr. Bd. of Trs. v. City of Pontiac, 873 N.W.2d 783,
791 (Mich. App. 2015) (citing to Tackett for the proposition that since the "rctirces' rights to
healthcare benefits flow from the pertinent CBAs, they are governed by ordinary contract
principles").
71. See 29 U.S.C. § 151(2) (2012) (excluding public employers); 29 U.S.C. § 142 (2012)
(adopting the NLRA's definition of employer for the LMRA).
72. Article XII Section 7 of the Alaska Constitution provides that "[m]cmbership in
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modify benefits unilaterally."
The "lifeline" presented by Tackett may also be strained by the
prefunding strategies adopted over the last decade by many public
sector plan sponsors in response to the GASB standards described in
Section III. To prefund OPEB liabilities, state and local governments
have set up OPEB trusts to hold assets that may be used only to
provide retiree health benefits and cover the relevant administrative
costs. The looming question is whether the strategy of prefunding
OPEB trusts will alter the legal status of OPEBs. 4 In particular, will
funding terms be read as evidence of the parties' intent to vest
benefits or, alternatively, if a CBA is found to be ambiguous, what
role will a prefunding strategy play in the assessment of extrinsic
evidence? The state of Michigan, for example, recently sought to
alleviate any such uncertainty. In legislation authorizing the issuance
of municipal securities "to pay the costs of the unfunded accrued
health care liabilit[ies]," Public Act 46 states that "the funding of
postemployment health care benefits by a county, city, village, or
township as provided in this act shall not constitute a contract to pay
the postemployment health care benefits."`5 The new law in Michigan
is the latest example of state-by-state variation in the legal provisions
that apply to the creation, vesting, and modification of OPEBs.
employee retirement systems of the State or its political subdivisions shall constitute a
contractual relationship. Accrued benefits of these systems shall not be diminished or
impaired." ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 7. In Duncan v. Retired Public Employees of Alaska, the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that "accrued benefits" included retiree health benefits. 71 P.3d
882, 886-87 (Alaska 2003). Litigation is ongoing in Illinois over recently enacted changes to the
state's obligation to contribute toward the cost of group health coverage for retirees. In 2014,
the Supreme Court of Illinois held that health insurance subsidies for state retirees that flowed
directly from membership in one of the state's public pension systems were constitutionally
protected by the state's pension protection clause. Accordingly, the General Assembly was
precluded from diminishing or impairing the benefits of retirees whose rights were governed by
the version of the Group Insurance Act in effect prior to the 2012 changes. Kancrva v. Weems,
13 N.E.3d 1228, 1240 (Ill. 2014).
73. For example, in Massachusetts, state law provides that while changes to healthcare
plan design and contribution rates for current employees must be accomplished through the
collective bargaining process, municipalitics have the authority to change retirce healthcare
insurance benefits unilaterally as long as the benefits meet the minimum standards set by the
Commonwealth. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32B, § 9A (2015); City of Somerville v. Cmmw.
Emp't Relations Bd., 24 N.E.3d 552 (Mass. 2015); see also RUTHANNE FULLER ET AL., CITY OF
NEWTON RETIREE BENEFITS: A PRIMER 6 (2014), available at <http://www.nowtonma.gov/
civicax/filebank/documents/58583>.
74. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 53, at 1180 (noting that "the law is unclear whether the
vesting of [post-retirement health benefits] may occur once a state decides on pre-funding as a
means of financing [post-retirement health benefits]").
75. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.2518 (2015).
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VI. ASSESSING PUBLIC EMPLOYER STRATEGIES FOR RETIREE
HEALTH PLANS
The expanded access to health insurance through the public
exchanges established by the ACA, together with the looming
Cadillac tax and the new disclosure requirements required under
GASB 75, alter significantly the conditions that have historically
underpinned the provision of retiree health benefits by public sector
employers. Most notably, public employers must now evaluate their
retiree health benefits in light of the individual coverage that early
retirees may obtain through the public exchanges. At the same time,
while GASB 75 rewards public employers for prefunding OPEBs,
such prefunding strategies may limit the flexibility to modify benefits.
This Part reviews the new retiree health landscape, outlines the
options currently available to public employers, and assesses the
trends in public sector OPEBs to date. The analysis suggests that
although public sector OPEB plans are likely to change in the coming
years, the ACA and GASB 75 reforms should ultimately leave
participants and taxpayers with greater clarity about the security and
the cost of post-employment benefits.
A. Maintaining the Status Quo
The aggregate level of unfunded OPEB liability for public
employers in the United States masks tremendous variation in
liabilities across different plans. Among state-sponsored OPEB plans,
the bulk of the unfunded liability belongs to a relatively small number
of plan sponsors. 76 The per capita unfunded OPEB liabilities also
range widely: from $10,726 in Alaska, to $6075 in Hawaii, $2037 in
South Carolina, $797 in Florida, and just $1 in Oklahoma.7 7 Using the
various actuarial methods permitted by GASB 45, eight states report
a per capita OPEB liability of $100 or less. While such statistics do
not reveal how the OPEB liabilities compare to the annual budgets or
revenues of the plan sponsors and do not take into account the
particular challenges that OPEBs may pose for municipal and county
governments, they nevertheless suggest that a subset of plan sponsors
76. By some estimates, over 75 percent of the total is carried by just ten statcs. JOSHUA
FRANZEL & ALEx BROWN, CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL Gov'T EXCELLENCE & NAT'L Ass'N OF
STATE RETIREMENT ADM'RS, SPOTLIGHT ON RETIREE HEALTH CARE BENEFITS FOR STATE &
LOCAL EMPLOYEES IN 2014, at 2 (2014), available at <http://slge.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/12/OPEB-Spotlight-1 2.14.pdf>.
77. CORSON, supra note 14, at 10-12.
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may not face any immediate pressure to deviate from the status quo.
Yet even public sponsors without immediate pressure to amend
OPEB plans should consider the future of such plans in the new
regulatory environment. In particular, plans maintained solely for
retirees and hence exempted from the ACA's insurance market
reforms may increasingly grow out-of-sync with ACA-compliant
plans, and with participant expectations about plan terms. Plans that
merely offer early retirees the opportunity to participate in group
coverage for active employees - the so-called "implicit subsidy" plans
- will have to consider whether the rates offered to early retirees by
public employers are competitive with the rates available on the
public exchanges. If not, the value of such OPEB plans as a
recruitment and retention tool will decrease dramatically.
B. Modifying Plan Terms
To the extent that OPEBs typically have not been subject to the
vesting requirements commonly applied to pension benefits, they
have - and continue to be - subject to frequent amendment at the
plan sponsors' discretion. Over the last decade, public sector OPEB
plan sponsors have sought various ways to decrease the cost of
OPEBs. Accordingly, state governments have increased premiums,
deductibles and copayment amounts, expanded eligibility
requirements, lowered cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) and, in
some cases, capped the total amount of state expenses for individual
retirees." In 2014 alone, 61 percent of state and local government
human resource executives reported having made changes to health
benefits over the past year, up from 45 percent in 2011.79 At present,
commentators continue to call on public sector employers to further
reduce and restructure OPEB plans by implementing reforms similar
to those described above.so In addition, consulting companies,
brokers, and insurers have been promoting so-called "private
exchanges" that allow individual employers to offer employees
multiple plans with different sets of benefit options." In a 2016 report,
for example, the New Jersey Pension and Health Benefit Study
78. See id. at 7.
79. FRANZEL & BROWN, supra note 76, at 2.
80. See, e.g., Robert Pozen, Renegotiating Retiree Health Care Plans After New Supreme
Court Guidance, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (May 7, 2015), <http://hcalthaIairs.org/blog/2015/
05/07/renegotiating-retiree-health-care-plans-after-new-supreme-court-guidance/>.
81. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2015 ANNUAL
SURVEY 8 (2015) [hcrcinafter KAISER SURVEY].
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Commission recommended providing state retirees with an annual
funding allotment to purchase coverage through such a private
exchange.82 The move would allow the state of New Jersey to reduce
and cap its "exceedingly costly" contributions to retiree healthcare by
offering a menu of plans that would, on average, result in higher out-
of-pocket costs for participants."
The reduction of retiree health benefits offers immediate costs-
savings but also frustrates participant and beneficiary expectations.
Over time, the reforms enacted under the ACA may limit public
tolerance for repeated changes to health insurance. The ACA's
employer mandate, insurance exchanges, premium tax credits, and
insurance standards all aim to ensure continued access to health
insurance either through employer-sponsored plans or through plans
purchased on the public exchanges. The uncertainty inherent in many
OPEB plans today may become increasingly incongruent with the
healthcare model espoused by the 2010 health reform. For now, some
legislators have attempted to stop the tide of repeated retiree benefit
reforms. For example, in January of 2016, New York state senators
introduced legislation to impose a uniform standard of protection that
would bar the state and local governments in New York from
diminishing health insurance benefits provided to retirees below
those in place as of the date of the act.84 Such legislative efforts reflect
the recent pattern of gradual but repeated reductions in OPEB plan
benefits. With the ACA and GASB 75, more significant structural
changes may be on the horizon.
C. Shifting Early Retirees onto Public Exchanges
As public employers consider the future of their OPEB plans,
they must consider what role, if any, the new health insurance
exchanges will play in the lives of public sector early retirees. One
82. N.J. PENSION & HEALTH BENEFIT STUDY COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON
HEALTH BENEFITS (2016), available at <http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pdf/NJPensionCom
mission-Supplemental-Report-on-Health-Benefits.pdf>.
83. Id. at 6. The proposal would replace the "platinum-plus" level plans currently provided
to retirees with plans that meet the "gold" lcycl standard under the ACA.
84. S. 3320, 2015 Leg., 238th Sess. (N.Y. 2015); see also Brian Molongoski, State Senate Bill
Could Burden Municipalities with More Health Care Costs, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES (Jan.
31, 2016), <http://www.watertowndailytimes.com/news03/state-senate-bill-could-burden-municip
alitics-with-more-health-care-costs-20160131>.
85. KAISER SURVEY, supra note 81, at 186 (reporting that twenty-six percent of employers
with 200 or more workers indicated that they are considering changes in the way they offer
retiree health benefits because of the new marketplaces).
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option is for public employers to maintain the status quo by
sponsoring retiree-only plans or permitting early retirees to
participate in the group coverage available to active employees. A
new option for public sector employers that sponsor retiree-only
plans is to take advantage of the ACA exchanges and of the federal
tax subsidies upheld by King v. Burwell. 1 Public employers may
terminate their benefit programs for early retirees, thereby forcing
such retirees onto the public exchanges. This strategy - recently
adopted by Detroit and Chicago - could, by some estimates, save
17state and local governments nearly $21 billion over ten years.
Under the unique exemption available to retiree-only plans,
public employers may also provide subsidies to retirees who obtain
individual coverage on the exchanges. While the ACA generally does
not permit employers to merely offer their employees stipends to
purchase insurance on the public exchanges, employers sponsoring
retiree-only plans can establish stand-alone health reimbursement
arrangements." Under this approach, retirees could compare the
subsidies provided by former employers to the premium tax subsidies
that would be available absent the employer plans and opt out of
employer sponsor coverage if such coverage does not offer the best
terms. Depending on the subsidies provided, such a move could result
in significant cost-savings, while also allowing public employers to
limit their liability to a specified annual contribution and to exit the
business of plan administration. To the extent that such a move would
implicitly embrace the exchanges created by the ACA, however,
willingness to consider this option may hinge on the political
preferences of the relevant policymakers.
86. 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2491-92, 2494-95 (2015) (ensuring that early retirees will have access to
the federal tax credits regardless of whether they purchase coverage on an exchange established
by a state or by the federal government).
87. See Goldhaber-Fiebert et al., supra note 12 (estimating that "that shifting retirees and
their houscholds to health insurance purchased on the exchanges could save SLGs nearly $21
billion over 10 years .... Every state would save."); Fran Spielman, Emanuel Completes Three-
Year Phaseout of Retiree Health Care Subsidy, CHICAGO SUN TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015, 10:01 PM),
<http://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/emanuel-completes-three-year-phaseout-of-retiree-health-
care-subsidy/>; Alana Scmucls, Cities Are Eliminating the Healthcare Benefits Once Promised to
Retirees, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 14, 2014), <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/10/
citics-are-climinating-the-healthcare-benelits-once-promised-to-retirees/381375/>.
88. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2015-17, 2015-14 I.R.B. 845 (reiterating prior guidance that
"employer payment plans are group health plans that will fail to comply with the market
reforms that apply to group health plans under the Affordable Care Act").
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D. Prefunding
For any given level of benefits that public employers choose to
provide, GASB 75 amplifies the incentives created by GASB 45 to
prefund OPEB liabilities. Prefunding has both long-term and short-
term consequences for public employers. In the long term, the
investment returns decrease the required employer contributions. In
the short term, putting in place a prefunding strategy immediately
permits OPEB sponsors to use a higher discount rate to calculate the
present value of accrued liabilities. A higher discount rate generates a
lower liability, which is critical since GASB 75 requires plan sponsors
to include the net OPEB liability on the plan sponsors' balance
sheets. Recent actuarial calculations prepared for California's state
controller illustrate the impact of prefunding on the discount rate and
on the liability calculation: With pay-as-you-go funding, the assumed
discount rate is 4.25 percent and the 2015 actuarial accrued liability
totals $74.19 billion. Conversely, fully funding the OPEB obligation
over a thirty-year period justifies a discount rate of 7.28 percent, and
in turn, an actuarial accrued liability of just $48.50 billion. As the
controller has emphasized, prefunding just 10 percent of the total
obligation increases up-front costs but ultimately takes $3.29 billion
off of the state's unfunded liability because of investment returns and
compound interest."
The impact of prefunding on the liability calculations helps to
explain the significant changes in OPEB funding patterns over the
last decade. Whereas prior to the passage of GASB 45, pay-as-you-go
funding was the norm, today, over half the states have dedicated
trusts to prefund OPEB liabilities." Funding ratios, as well as the
percentage of the ARC contributed have increased over time, with
state sponsors contributing on average 55 percent of the ARC in
2013. Between 2005 and 2015, numerous plan sponsors took the
controversial step of issuing bonds - totaling almost $1.98 billion in
the aggregate - to prefund OPEB liabilities.92 OPEB funding - as
opposed to just benefits - has also become the subject of collective
89. Press Release, Cal. State Controller's Office, State Controller Yec Updates Unfunded
Retiree Health Care Liability (Jan. 26. 2016), available at <http://www.sco.ca.gov/eo-press
rel 16936.html>.
90. CORSON, supra note 14, at 5.
91. FRANZEL & BROWN, supra note 76, at 4.
92. Lynn Hume, GFOA: States, Localities Shouldn't Issue OPEB Bonds, THE BOND
BUYER (Jan. 28, 2016), <http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/washington-budget-finance/gfoa-sta
tes-localitics-shouldnt-issuc-opcb-bonds-1095144-1.html>.
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bargaining agreements and state legislation."
While the overall trend toward prefunding is clear, the ability of
plan sponsors to achieve their funding goals, and the impact of any
funding progress on the legal status of OPEBs is far less certain. To
start with the latter issue, prefunding requires plan sponsors to set
aside funds in a manner that restricts their use to the payment of
OPEBs and immediately deprives the plan sponsor of flexibility with
respect to the assets in the trust. The amounts set aside in OPEB
trusts secure the claims of OPEB plan participants. But what effect
does the gradual or partial funding of OPEB liabilities have on the
nature of the legal obligation to provide OPEBs? To what extent
does prefunding OPEBs bring the analysis of applicable legal
protections closer to the analysis used for public pension benefits?
While definitive guidance is lacking - and indeed the answer is
unlikely to be uniform across states - provisions and progress for
funding OPEBs are consistent with the vesting of such benefits.
Accordingly, where either legislation or collective bargaining
agreements leave some ambiguity about the status of OPEBs,
prefunding of future liabilities may serve as evidence in favor of
vesting.
The impact of prefunding is also likely to vary with the success of
the funding efforts undertaken by different plan sponsors. While a
majority of states have now created OPEB trusts, average funding
levels remain low, and certain trusts have received minimal
contributions. 4 Indeed, some have already expressed concern that
GASB 75 will merely encourage state and local governments to join
the "prefunding club," using rosy assumptions to generate immediate
discount rate benefits, but that it will not be sufficient to ensure that
plan sponsors follow through with the annual contributions required
93. Glazier, supra note 4. In recent years. some states have enacted statutory provisions for
fundin2 the full ARC. See, e.g., 36 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 36-12.1-19 (West 2015) (rcouirin2 the
actuary to comoute, and the state of Rhode Island to contribute "a yearlv emplover
contribution that will: (1) Pay the actuarial estimate of the normal cost for the next succeedin2
fiscal year: (2) Amortize the unfunded liability of the system as of June 30, 2006 utilizing a time
ocriod not to exceed thirty (30) vears"). Others have limited ability of public emolovers to incur
additional unfunded liabilities. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 5, § 286-B (2015) ("Unfunded liabilities
may not be created except those resulting from experience losses.").
94. The average funding locvl across all states as of fiscal year 2013 was 9.4 percent.
CORSON, supra note 14, at 10-12. The Louisiana state legislature, for example, approved the
creation of an OPEB trust in 2008 but it was not funded as of year-end 2015. STATE OF LA.,
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2015,
at 84 (2015).
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to reach full funding." Analysis of funding patterns among U.S. public
pension plans suggests that the variation in institutional design -
particularly with respect to the allocation of control over funding
decisions and the availability of mechanisms to monitor and enforce
funding commitments - is likely to be associated with variation in
funding discipline among OPEB plans." Across all OPEB plans,
GASB 75's elimination of the requirement that plan sponsors report
annual contributions relative to the ARC benchmark will undermine
the ability of participants, taxpayers, and analysts to easily assess and
compare funding progress for OPEB liabilities.
VII. CONCLUSION
The ACA and the new GASB accounting standards expand both
the challenges and the choices facing state and local governments that
sponsor OPEB plans. As public employers look to reduce their
unfunded healthcare obligations, the majority of states have begun to
prefund OPEBs to take advantage of the immediate accounting
benefits and the long-term savings that prefunding offers. At the
same time, a small but growing number of plan sponsors have chosen
95. Robert C. Pozen & Joshua D. Rauh, Relief for Cities' Budget-Busting Health-Care
Costs, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2015, at A13. Pozen and Rauh express concern about the use of
overly optimistic assumptions both with respect to the investment returns and the rate of future
employer contributions. They offer the following example to illustrate the incentives under
GASB 75: Consider a city that currently reports a $1 billion liability for its retiree health-care
obligations, based on an average life of twenty years for benefit payments and a discount rate of
5 percent. Under the new GASB rules, the city must use the interest rate on high-quality, tax-
exempt bonds with a maturity of twenty years, or 3.3 percent today, which brings the reported
liability to approximately $1.35 billion. If, instead, the city contributes $100 million to a qual-
ifying trust and assumes that the trust's investments will earn an average annual return of 6 per-
cent, and that each year it will contribute enough to pay the premiums for current retirees so the
trust doesn't run out of money in the future, the city's unfunded liabilities decrease from $1.35
billion to as low as $750 million. Id.
96. Indeed, while much of the prior research has focused on state-by-state comparisons of
OPEB obligations, funding patterns are likely to depend on the particular features of the more
than one hundred individual state-administered OPEB plans, and the hundreds of OPEB plans
administered by municipalities and local agencies. See, e.g., STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK
FORCE, FINAL REPORT (2014), available at <http://www.pgpf.org/sites/default/files/statebud
get crisis taskforccjfinalreport_01142014.pdf>; Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal Constitutions
and the Law and Politics of Public Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117; Natalya Shnitser,
Funding Discipline for U.S. Public Pension Plans: An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Design,
100 IOWA L. REV. 663 (2015).
97. See, e.g., ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON
COLL., STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS No. 23, How WOULD GASB PROPOSALS AFFECT
STATE AND LOCAL PENSION REPORTING? 5 (2012), available at <http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/
uploads/201 1/11/slp_23.pdf> (noting that in the context of GASB 67 and 68, the climination of
the ARC benchmark "represents a loss in analysts' ability to assess how close plan contributions
are to those required to keep the system on track").
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to cease offering retiree health benefits and to shift pre-Medicare
retirees onto the public exchanges newly available under the ACA.
Although the coming years will undoubtedly bring significant changes
to the form and financing of public sector retiree health benefits, the
expanded individual access to health insurance through the
exchanges, the federal subsidies upheld by King v. Burwell, and the
prefunding efforts spurred by GASB 75 should ultimately mitigate
the economic and legal uncertainty that plagues many public plans
today.

